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## RESEARCH AID

# INPUT FACTORS FOR PRODUCTION OF AMMUNITION IN THE USSR



CIA/RR RA-10

22 October 1956

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

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FOREWORD

The approach used in this research aid is similar to that of CIA/RR 49, Inputs for the Production of Ammunition in the European Satellites, 17 December 1954, SECRET. Because of the lack of specific Soviet input data and the similarity of the processes and products of the US and Soviet ammunition industries, this research aid uses data on US production of ammunition as a basis for calculating Soviet ammunition input requirements. This research aid differs from CIA/RR 49 in that a somewhat different format has been used and the calculations have been refined. In the preparation of this research aid, all calculations have been recomputed from the initial data, and no data have been transferred from CIA/RR 49. Therefore, where any discrepancies occur between this research aid and CIA/RR 49, such as in the gross input factors and inputs of services -- all of which are based upon US practice -- the figures given in this research aid represent revised estimates.

The results are of use in the analysis of materials balances, in the development of use patterns in estimates for the chemicals and metals required, and in the estimates of requirements for consumption in connection with Western export controls.

This research aid has been coordinated on a working level with the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; with the Directorate of Intelligence, Department of the Air Force; and with the Office of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy.

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CIA/RR RA-10  
(ORR Project 31.487)

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INPUT FACTORS FOR PRODUCTION OF AMMUNITION IN THE USSR\*

Summary

This research aid derives gross input factors and recoverable scrap factors for application to estimates of production of ammunition in the USSR exclusive of underwater ordnance. Ammunition mixes were determined for the Soviet Army, Navy, Air Force, and security troops, based on 1 unit of fire (U/F), or its equivalent, for each weapon in the active units. The total weight of 1 U/F for the Soviet armed forces is estimated at 267,000 short tons.\*\* The requirements of the Soviet Army for 1 U/F amount to 214,000 tons, or 80 percent of this total weight. The Soviet Navy accounts for about 8 percent; the Soviet Air Force including naval aviation, for about 7 percent; and the security troops, for almost 5 percent of the total Soviet requirements for ammunition.

The ammunition mixes were collated into a total mix and divided into seven categories of weapons according to the physical characteristics of the various rounds. The gross inputs and recoverable scrap in the production of each category and of the total were then derived by the use of comparable US factors.

Estimated input factors for the total ammunition mix are summarized in Table 1\*\*\* in terms of 1,000 tons of production of such a mix.

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\* The estimates and conclusions contained in this research aid represent the best judgment of ORR as of 15 August 1956.

\*\* Tonnages throughout this research aid are given in short tons.

\*\*\* Table 1 follows on p. 2.

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Table 1

Estimated Input Factors of Materials and Services and Scrap Recovered  
in Production of 1,000 Short Tons of Ammunition in the USSR a/

Materials or Service	Unit of Measurement	Input Factors per 1,000 Short Tons of Aggregate Ammunition Mix	Recoverable Scrap per 1,000 Short Tons of Aggregate Ammunition Mix
Cast iron	Short tons	96	36
Carbon steel and alloy steel b/	Short tons	930	350
Copper c/	Short tons	320 d/	150 d/
Zinc e/	Short tons	110 d/	52 d/
Lead	Short tons	23	
Propellants	Short tons	130	
Explosives	Short tons	100	
Manpower f/ (loading, assembling, and packing only)	Man-years	13 g/	
Electric power (loading, assembling, and packing only)	Thousand kilowatt-hours	200 h/	
Coal as alternate fuel (loading, assembling, and packing only)	Short tons	95 i/	
Oil as alternate fuel (loading, assembling, and packing only)	Short tons	55 j/	
Natural gas as alternate fuel (loading, assembling, and packing only)	Short tons	50 k/	
Lumber for packing	Thousand board-feet	240 l/	
Steel for packing	Short tons	21 m/	

a. Exclusive of underwater ordnance. All data are rounded to two significant figures.

b. Finished steel.

c. Includes the 70 percent copper content in brass items such as cartridge cases.

d. Excludes the re-use of approximately 70 percent of fired cartridge cases, the remelting of the remaining 30 percent, and the possible extensive substitution of steel for brass.

e. Thirty percent zinc content of brass items.

f. Direct labor.

g. Manpower for the manufacture of metal parts might be 8 to 12 times as much.

h. Electric power for the manufacture of metal parts might be several times as much.

i. Fuels for the manufacture of metal parts might be 8 to 14 times as much at an average value of 10,450 British thermal units (Btu) per pound.

j. Fuels for the manufacture of metal parts might be 8 to 14 times as much at an average value of 18,000 Btu per pound.

k. Fuels for the manufacture of metal parts might be 8 to 14 times as much at an average value of 39.9 million Btu per short ton.

l. Excludes repeated re-use of boxes and containers.

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I. Introduction.

The purpose of this research aid is to develop input factors per 1,000 tons of ammunition by which materials and services consumed in production of ammunition in the USSR can be estimated for a given tonnage of an ammunition aggregate.

Information from the USSR about the materials and services required to produce Soviet ammunition is practically nonexistent. Consequently, it is necessary to approach the problem through the utilization of the considerable body of information available on the types and quantities of ammunition required by the Soviet armed forces. The types and quantities of ammunition required, in the proper proportion to each other, constitute an ammunition mix which can be analyzed round by round to determine the component materials, both qualitatively and quantitatively. By the application of industrial factors for losses of scrap, for manpower, and for consumption of electric power and fuel to the ammunition mix, the materials and services required can be estimated. The industrial factors are taken from US practice but are considered to be applicable to the Soviet ammunition industry because of similarities in Soviet and US industrial practices in the ammunition industry. One important difference between Soviet and US practices may occur when steel is substituted for brass in the event of a shortage of copper.

Although this method constitutes an indirect approach to the problem, it is a practical technique which produces reasonable results, particularly when unit inputs are applied to large aggregate amounts of ammunition such as annual estimates of production of stockpiles.\*

Future information on the Soviet order of battle may reveal new weapons in sizable quantities. A practical, but minor, limitation to the method used in this research aid may result when the initial requirements of these new weapons for ammunition to be stockpiled are entered into the calculations.

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\* For the methodology, see Appendix A.

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## II. Ammunition Mixes.

### A. Soviet Armed Forces.

The Soviet armed forces are made up of the army, the security troops, the navy (which includes the fleet, the coast defense artillery, the naval infantry battalions, and naval aviation), and the air force.

Each of the armed forces requires an ammunition mix suitable to the types and quantities of weapons that are included in its Tables of Organization and Equipment (T/O and E). The following paragraphs briefly describe the ammunition mix for each of the armed forces.

#### 1. Soviet Army.

The ammunition mix for the Soviet Army is based upon the unit of fire (U/F), a unit of measure for the supply of ammunition. This measure represents a specified number of rounds per weapon -- a nominal supply of ammunition for 1 day -- which varies with the type, caliber, and individual rate of consumption of a weapon. For example, the U/F for a Soviet 152-millimeter (mm) howitzer is 40 rounds, and the U/F for a 7.62-mm heavy machinegun is 2,500 rounds. A Soviet rifle division usually carries 0.5 U/F with each weapon, 0.5 U/F in the regimental combat train for the same weapons, and an additional 0.5 U/F in the divisional combat train -- a total of 1.5 U/F per weapon. In actual practice, consumption may run as high as 2 U/F per day in combat and as low as 0.2 U/F per year in peacetime training. 1/\*

When totaled on a national level, the U/F for all weapons in the active military units represents an ammunition mix in which the amounts, kinds, and sizes of ammunition indicate the expected relative requirements by the armed services for each type of ammunition. On the basis of the T/O and E of the Soviet Army, an estimate was made of the number and types of weapons in the 175 standing line divisions and in the supporting and antiaircraft units. 2/ When the weights per round 3/ and the U/F for each weapon 4/ are multiplied by the number of weapons in each category, the estimated weights shown in Table 2\*\* are obtained.

\* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix C.

\*\* Table 2 follows on p. 5.

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Table 2

Estimated Weight of 1 Unit of Fire for the Soviet Army  
Based on 175 Line Divisions  
with Supporting and Antiaircraft Units

Weapon	Short Tons
Weight	
203-mm <u>a/</u> gun-howitzer	2,550
152-mm gun-howitzer and self-propelled gun	4,510
152-mm howitzer	7,170
122-mm gun	14,500
122-mm howitzer	24,400
100-mm gun	52,300
76.2- and 85-mm gun	42,000
57-mm gun	9,290
37-mm antiaircraft gun	1,860
160- and 240-mm mortar	4,240
120-mm mortar	6,510
82-mm mortar	3,550
132- and 300-mm rockets	2,410
107-mm recoilless projectiles	2,600
SPG-82 antitank projectiles	426
RPG-2 antitank projectiles	513
12.7- and 14.5-mm machinegun	11,000
7.62- and 9-mm small arms	16,500
Antitank and antitransport mines	1,740
Antitank grenades	330
Hand grenades	5,800
Total	<u>214,000</u> <u>b/</u>

a. Millimeter.

b. Rounded.

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2. Soviet Security Troops.

The T/O and E of the Soviet security troops is not well known except that about 150,000 of these troops are border guards who are equipped like infantry and that about 250,000 of them are interior troops (MVD) who are similarly equipped but have motorized and mechanized elements. 5/ The 150,000 border guards have been equated on a basis of the number of men per standard company with 580 army infantry companies in order to establish a synthetic T/O and E. Of the interior troops, 50 percent were assigned to rifle regiments, 25 percent to motorized regiments, and 25 percent to mechanized regiments (because these units have a few tanks and artillery pieces). For the purposes of this research aid, the 250,000 interior troops equal -- on the basis of the number of men per standard regiment -- 35 rifle regiments, 29 motorized regiments, and 25 mechanized regiments.

Table 3\* shows the estimated weight of 1 U/F for 400,000 Soviet security troops.

3. Soviet Naval Fleet.\*\*

Navies do not operate logistically on a U/F basis as do armies. The naval unit of measure for the supply of ammunition is the allowance of ammunition for a ship. The allowance of ammunition depends on the capacities of a ship's magazines and ready-boxes. Ships of similar classes will have similar allowances. A naval unit of ammunition tonnage corresponding to the army U/F tonnage has been established in this report as one-sixth of an allowance for each known combat and auxiliary armed vessel in the Soviet Navy.\*\*\* 6/ Although it is possible that this estimate may be high, naval ammunition constitutes less than 2 percent of the total requirements for ammunition, and an overstatement would result in little or no change of input factors.

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\* Table 3 follows on p. 7.

\*\* Exclusive of underwater ordnance.

\*\*\* One-sixth of an allowance is considered as equal to an army U/F in this research aid because test calculations on ammunition allotted to certain navy guns, as compared with that allotted to somewhat similar army guns, indicated that the navy allowance per gun averages 6 times the army U/F per gun. This ratio is reasonable when it is considered that a ship must expect to maintain itself without means of resupply for weeks, as compared with days for an army unit.

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Table 3

Estimated Weight of 1 Unit of Fire  
for 400,000 Soviet Security Troops

Short Tons	
Weapon	Weight
85-mm <u>a/</u> tank gun	1,220
85-mm antitank gun	1,590
76-mm self-propelled gun	271
57-mm gun	2,610
120-mm mortar	457
82-mm mortar	1,290
SPG-82 antitank projectiles	97
RPG-2 antitank projectiles	153
12.7-mm machinegun	1,210
7.62-mm machinegun and rifle	1,440
7.62-mm submachinegun and pistol	278
Antitank grenades	104
Hand grenades	1,000
Land mines	564
Total	<u>12,300</u> <u>b/</u>

a. Millimeter.  
b. Rounded.

Because the Soviet Navy still has many old naval pieces of foreign and Tsarist manufacture, there is a large assortment of calibers among its weapons.

Table 4\* shows the estimated weight of 1 equivalent U/F for the Soviet naval fleet. 7/

\* Table 4 follows on p. 8.

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Table 4

Estimated Weight of 1 Equivalent Unit of Fire  
for the Soviet Naval Fleet

Weapon	Short Tons
Weight	
12.6-inch Italian gun	218
12-inch Tsarist gun	390
10-inch Bofors gun	123
7.1-inch Soviet gun	215
6-inch Soviet and Italian guns	520
5.9-inch German gun	40.8
5.1-inch Soviet and Tsarist guns	450
5-inch German gun	10
4.7-inch Tsarist and Italian guns	111
4.1-inch Bofors and German guns	61.8
4-inch Tsarist gun	14.6
3.9-inch Soviet dual-purpose gun	803
3.5-inch German gun	139
3-inch Soviet and US dual-purpose guns	175
57-mm a/ Soviet antiaircraft gun	66.7
45-mm Soviet gun	258
37-mm Soviet antiaircraft gun	1,000
20-mm Soviet antiaircraft gun	86.5
12.7-mm Soviet antiaircraft machinegun	81
Total	4,760 b/

a. Millimeter.

b. Rounded.

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4. Soviet Coast Defense Artillery.

In the USSR the defense of the coast against both surface and air attack is the responsibility of the navy, and the system of coast defense is extensive. 8/ One-sixth of a ship's allowance for each particular size of gun in the Soviet coast defense artillery has been allocated as an equivalent U/F, as explained in 3, above.

Table 5\* shows the estimated weight of 1 equivalent U/F for the Soviet coast defense artillery.

5. Soviet Naval Infantry.

The Soviet naval infantry is organized into battalions and sometimes into brigades of the size of regimental combat teams. The principal task of the naval infantry, which is an element of the coast defense, is to defend naval installations and certain sectors of the coast in which the Soviet Navy has an interest. 9/

Table 6\*\* shows the estimated weight of 1 U/F for the naval infantry. 10/

6. Soviet Naval Aviation.

The ammunition mix for Soviet naval aviation has been included in that of the Soviet Air Force, a description of which follows.

7. Soviet Air Force.

Because the Soviet Air Force does not use an ammunition unit comparable to an army U/F or a naval ship's allowance, for the purposes of this research aid, 1 load of bombs and ammunition for each combat plane in the Soviet Air Force (including naval aviation) is considered the equivalent of 1 U/F. This equivalent U/F will compare with the quantity of ammunition carried by the army with each weapon combined with what is carried in the regimental train.

\* Table 5 follows on p. 10.

\*\* Table 6 follows on p. 10.

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Table 5

Estimated Weight of 1 Equivalent Unit of Fire  
for the Soviet Coast Defense Artillery

Short Tons	
Weapon	Weight
14-inch naval gun	273
12-inch naval gun	1,560
7.1-inch naval gun	1,340
6-inch naval gun	2,980
5.1-inch naval gun	2,550
3.9-inch dual-purpose gun	2,310
3-inch dual-purpose gun	1,310
57-mm a/ antiaircraft gun	2,780
37-mm antiaircraft gun	646
Total	<u>15,700 b/</u>

a. Millimeter.    b. Rounded.

Table 6

Estimated Weight of 1 Unit of Fire  
for the Soviet Naval Infantry

Short Tons	
Weapon	Weight
82-mm a/ mortar	112
SPG-82 antitank projectiles	39.7
7.62-mm machinegun and rifle	98.2
7.62-mm submachinegun and pistol	41.3
Hand grenades	184
Total	<u>475 b/</u>

a. Millimeter.    b. Rounded.

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Table 7\* shows the estimated weight of 1 equivalent U/F for the Soviet Air Force. 11/ The method employed yields a figure which appears high, but this figure is only 7 percent of the over-all weight and would not affect the input factors to any great extent.

B. Relative Requirements for Ammunition According to Component of the Armed Forces.

Table 8\*\* summarizes the ammunition mixes previously given and shows the relative requirements for ammunition in the various components of the armed forces in the order of their importance. The most reliable information from which these ammunition mixes have been computed concerns the army, which is the largest consumer of ammunition, requiring 80 percent of the total.

III. Inputs for Production of Ammunition.

A. Inputs of Materials.

The Soviet ammunition industry is considered in this research aid to comprise those plants and shops which form, load, assemble, and pack the metal parts of ammunition. These installations receive metallic materials from mills and foundries in the shape of pigs, billets, bars, plates, sheets, rods, wire, tubing, and pipe. Scrap metal is considered an output of the ammunition industry but an input back to the mills and foundries or to the scrap metal industry, less the loss in remelting. Propellants and explosives are considered to be received, ready for use, from the explosives or the chemical industry. Lumber is considered to be received as sawn wood ready to be made into packing boxes.

1. Component Materials.

The most important materials used in production of ammunition are cast iron, carbon steel, alloy steel, brass, copper, lead, propellants, explosives, and packing lumber. Cast iron and carbon steel are used in projectiles for fragmentation, and carbon steel is also used in fuses and for a few types of cartridge cases. Alloy steel is

\* Table 7 follows on p. 12.

\*\* Table 8 follows on p. 12.

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Table 7

Estimated Weight of 1 Equivalent Unit of Fire  
for the Soviet Air Force (Including Naval Aviation)

Short Tons	
Weapon	Weight
37-mm a/ aircraft gun	560
23-mm aircraft gun	1,840
12.7-mm aircraft machinegun	148
7.62-mm aircraft machinegun	40.2
General-purpose or demolition bombs	5,910
Fragmentation bombs	3,390
Armor-piercing bombs	1,930
Incendiary bombs	3,750
Aircraft rockets	1,810
Total	<u>19,400 b/</u>

a. Millimeter.    b. Rounded.

Table 8

Estimated Requirements for 1 Unit of Fire or the Equivalent  
for Various Components of the Soviet Armed Forces

Armed Force	Weight of 1 Unit of Fire (Short Tons)	Percent of Total
Army	214,000	80.2
Air Force (including naval aviation)	19,400	7.3
Coast defense artillery	15,700	5.9
Security troops	12,300	4.6
Naval fleet	4,760	1.8
Naval infantry	475	0.2
Total	<u>267,000 a/</u>	<u>100.0</u>

a. Rounded.

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used for armor-piercing projectiles. Brass, composed of 70 percent copper and 30 percent zinc, is used in cartridge cases, primers, detonators, and fuses. Copper is used for rotating bands. Lead is used in bullets for small arms. Aluminum is a negligible material in ammunition. In US ammunition, some fuse parts are aluminum, but corresponding Soviet fuse parts are steel.

Inasmuch as the term component materials in this research aid refers to the actual amounts of materials in each round of ammunition, the weight of a complete round is the sum of the weights of the component materials of that round. The estimated breakdown of the component materials in individual rounds of Soviet ammunition is shown in Table 9.\* All the ammunition and the corresponding tonnages which were discussed under the ammunition mixes have been redistributed into the following seven categories of ammunition: heavy artillery, medium artillery, light artillery, small arms, mortars and grenades, rockets and antitank weapons, and bombs and landmines. This redistribution was necessary because the mixes had to be derived from military T/O and E's, whereas an input study is more readily accomplished if the ammunition is grouped according to its structure, its component materials, and the processes involved in its production.

## 2. Gross Inputs.

Gross, or total, inputs of materials include those materials which are purchased by and flow through an ammunition plant in the processing of the final product, the finished ammunition. A part of these materials becomes component materials in the final product, and the remainder becomes scrap. The weights of the component materials shown in Table 9\* were multiplied by certain factors to obtain the gross inputs. These factors represent the ratio of the weights of the gross inputs to the weights of the component materials. When the weights of the component materials are multiplied by the gross input factors, the resulting figures are the weights of the gross inputs. The difference between the weights of the gross inputs and the weights of the component materials represents metallic scrap. As noted in 3, below, a large portion of this scrap is recoverable. The gross input factors for production are as follows: 1.9 for cast iron, carbon steel, and alloy steel; 2.1 for brass and copper; and 1.02 for lead, propellants, and explosives.\*\*\*

\* Table 9 follows on p. 14.

\*\* For the methodology used in the derivation of these factors, see Appendix A.

\*\*\* Continued on p. 17.

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Table 9

Estimated Weights of Component Materials in 1 Unit of Fire  
or the Equivalent for Various Categories of Soviet Ammunition a/\*

Weapon	Cast Iron	Carbon Steel	Alloy Steel	Brass	Copper	Lead	Propellants	Explosives	Short Tons
Heavy artillery									Total
14-inch naval gun			191		8.2		64.2	9.6	273
12.6-inch naval gun			157		6.5		46.2	7.85	218
12-inch naval gun			1,420		58.5		403	68.2	1,950
10-inch naval gun			90.4		3.69		24.6	4.3	123
203-mm b/ gun-howitzer		1,800			76.5		332	347	2,550
7.1-inch naval gun			1,060		46.8		374	79.6	1,560
152-mm gun-howitzer and self-propelled gun		2,690		663	135		582	437	4,510
152-mm howitzer		5,020		366	215		531	1,040	7,170
6-inch naval gun			1,900	616	105		700	175	3,500
5.9-inch naval gun			21.5	7.18	1.22		8.81	2.04	40.8
Total heavy artillery		9,510	4,840	1,650	656		3,070	2,170	21,900
Medium artillery									
5.1-inch naval gun		1,650		555	90		537	165	3,000
5-inch naval gun		5.5		1.84	0.30		1.81	5.5	10
122-mm gun		3,670	3,670	2,650	435		2,350	1,730	14,500
122-mm howitzer		16,500		1,660	732		1,980	3,510	24,400
4.7-inch naval gun		60.5		21.2	3.33		19.8	6.22	111
4.1-inch naval gun		34.4		12.0	1.85		10.2	3.28	61.8
4-inch naval gun		8.07		2.96	0.44		2.34	0.79	14.6
100-mm gun		22,400		15,000	1,570		9,520	3,770	52,300
3.9-inch naval dual-purpose gun		1,490		837	93.3		541	152	3,110
3.5-inch naval gun		74.2		30.2	4.17		23.5	6.95	139
76.2- and 85-mm gun		12,500	12,500	8,660	1,350		7,760	2,350	45,100
3-inch naval dual-purpose gun		811		349	44.7		229	56.6	1,490
Total medium artillery		59,200	16,200	29,800	4,330		23,000	11,800	144,000

\* Footnotes for Table 9 follow on p. 16.

Table 9  
Estimated Weights of Component Materials in 1 Unit of Fire  
or the Equivalent for Various Categories of Soviet Ammunition  
(Continued)

Short Tons									
Weapon	Cast Iron	Carbon Steel	Alloy Steel	Brass	Copper	Lead	Propellants	Explosives	Total
Light artillery									
57-mm gun		2,930	2,930	3,900	357		1,580	202	11,900
57-mm naval antiaircraft gun		1,520		1,060	85.5		94	91.2	2,850
45-mm naval gun		173		59.3	7.74		9.03	9.03	258
37-mm antiaircraft gun		1,580		1,200	105		523	102	3,510
37-mm aircraft gun		249		197	16.8		82.9	13.4	560
23-mm aircraft gun		957		611	55.2		162	55.2	1,840
20-mm antiaircraft gun		37.5		32	2.6		10.6	3.81	86.5
Total light artillery		7,450	2,930	7,060	630		2,460	477	21,000
Small arms									
12.7- and 14.5-mm machine gun		2,720		5,980	1,690	397	1,620		12,400
7.62- and 9-mm small arms		6,500		3,640		5,720	2,540		18,400
Total small arms		9,220		9,620	1,690	6,120	4,160		30,800
Mortars and grenades									
160- and 240-mm mortar		3,400					131	708	4,240
120-mm mortar	2,795	2,795					216	1,160	6,970
82-mm mortar	4,170						134	648	4,950
Antitank grenades		234						200	434
Hand grenades	6,440							560	7,000
Total mortars and grenades	13,400	6,430					481	3,280	23,600

Table 9  
Estimated Weights of Component Materials in 1 Unit of Fire  
or the Equivalent for Various Categories of Soviet Ammunition.  
(Continued)

Weapon	Cast Iron	Carbon Steel	Alloy Steel	Brass	Copper	Lead	Propellants	Explosives	Total
Rockets and antitank projectiles									
300-mm artillery rockets		249	124				74	207	654
132-mm artillery and aircraft rockets		1,720	862				595	381	3,560
107-mm recoilless projectiles		1,150	575				497	380	2,600
SFG-82 antitank projectiles		249	124				108	82.2	563
RRG-2 antitank projectiles		295	147				127	97.2	666
Total rockets and antitank projectiles		3,660	1,830				1,400	1,150	8,040
Bombs and land mines									
General-purpose and demolition bombs		2,660			Negligible			3,250	5,910
Fragmentation bombs		3,050			Negligible			339	3,390
Armor-piercing bombs		560			Negligible			1,370	1,930
Incendiary bombs		2,250			Negligible			1,500 c/	3,750
Antitank and antitransport mines		483 d/			Negligible			1,330	2,300 e/
Total bombs and land mines		9,000			Negligible			7,790	17,300 e/
Grand total	13,400	104,500	25,800	48,100	7,310	6,120	34,600	26,700	267,000 e/

a. Because of rounding, figures may not add to totals shown.

b. Millimeter.

c. Mostly thermite.

d. Reduced 50 percent to allow for wooden mine cases.

e. Includes 483 tons allowed for wooden mine cases.

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The results obtained by applying the gross input factors to the estimated weights of the component materials in Table 9\* are shown in Table 10.\*\* These results are the gross inputs of materials required to produce 1 U/F for each of the 7 categories of ammunition and to produce an aggregate U/F for all 7 categories. Table 10 also shows the gross inputs required to produce 1,000 tons of any category of ammunition and 1,000 tons of the aggregate mix.

The gross inputs, expressed in terms of 1,000 tons of ammunition, serve as yardstick values in deriving estimates of materials for production of various categories and tonnages of Soviet ammunition. The gross inputs per 1,000 tons of ammunition may be applied to 1 or more of the categories of Soviet ammunition or to a general mix corresponding to the aggregate.

Not reflected in the material inputs are the practices of returning brass cartridge cases to the factories for re-use or remelting and the possible substitution of steel for brass in cartridge cases and of soft iron for copper in rotating bands. In view of these practices, the brass and copper inputs in the above values represent maximum figures.

### 3. Losses and Recovery of Scrap.

Metallic scrap derived from production is not entirely lost. Most of this scrap can be recovered and sold to the scrap metal industry. The unrecoverable portions, called remelt losses, are caused mainly by oxidation and scale. The small losses of lead, propellants, and explosives are not recoverable. Procedures similar to those used to obtain the weight of the gross inputs were used to obtain the totals of recoverable scrap. The weights of the component materials, shown in Table 9, were multiplied by the following factors for recovery of scrap: 0.72 for cast iron, carbon steel, and alloy steel, and 0.97 for brass and copper. The results, shown in Table 10, represent recoverable scrap.\*\*\*

\* P. 14, above.

\*\* Table 10 follows on p. 18.

\*\*\* Continued on p. 21.

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Table 10

Estimated Gross Inputs of Materials Required to Produce 1 Unit of Fire or the Equivalent  
for Various Categories of Soviet Ammunition and Quantities of Scrap Recoverable in Production

Category of Weapon	Cast Iron $\frac{a}{*}$	Carbon Steel $\frac{a}{*}$	Alloy Steel $\frac{a}{*}$	Brass $\frac{b}{*}$	Copper $\frac{b}{*}$	Lead $\frac{c}{*}$	Propellants $\frac{c}{*}$	Explosives $\frac{c}{*}$	Short Tons	
									Total $\frac{d}{*}$	Total $\frac{d}{*}$
Heavy artillery										
Weight of component materials		9,510	4,840	1,650	656		3,070	2,170	21,900	
Weight of gross inputs		18,100	9,200	3,460	1,380		3,130	2,210	37,500	
Weight of recoverable scrap		6,850	3,480	1,600	636				12,600	
Gross inputs per 1,000 tons of ammunition		826	420	158	63		143	101	1,710	
Recoverable scrap per 1,000 tons of ammunition		313	159	73.1	29				574	
Medium artillery										
Weight of component materials		59,200	16,200	29,800	4,330		23,000	11,800	144,000	
Weight of gross inputs		112,000	30,800	62,600	9,100		23,500	12,000	250,000	
Weight of recoverable scrap		42,600	11,700	28,900	4,200				87,400	
Gross inputs per 1,000 tons of ammunition		778	214	435	63.2		163	83.3	1,740	
Recoverable scrap per 1,000 tons of ammunition		296	81.2	201	29.2				607	
Light artillery										
Weight of component materials		7,450	2,930	7,060	630		2,460	477	21,000	
Weight of gross inputs		14,200	5,570	14,800	1,320		2,510	487	38,900	
Weight of recoverable scrap		5,360	2,110	6,850	611				14,900	
Gross inputs per 1,000 tons of ammunition		676	265	705	62.9		120	23.2	1,850	
Recoverable scrap per 1,000 tons of ammunition		255	100	326	29.1				710	

\* Footnotes for Table 10 follow on p. 20.

Table 10  
Estimated Gross Inputs of Materials Required to Produce 1 Unit of Fire or the Equivalent  
for Various Categories of Soviet Ammunition and Quantities of Scrap Recoverable in Production  
(Continued)

Category of Weapon	Cast Iron a/	Carbon Steel a/	Alloy Steel a/	Brass b/	Copper b/	Lead c/	Propellants c/	Explosives c/	Total d/
Small arms									
Weight of component materials		9,220		9,620	1,690	6,120	4,160		30,800
Weight of gross inputs		17,500		20,200	3,550	6,240	4,240		51,700
Weight of recoverable scrap		6,640		9,330	1,640				17,600
Gross inputs per 1,000 tons of ammunition		568		656	115	203	138		1,680
Recoverable scrap per 1,000 tons of ammunition		216		303	53				572
Mortars and grenades									
Weight of component materials	13,400	6,430					481	3,280	23,600
Weight of gross inputs	25,500	12,200					491	3,350	41,500
Weight of recoverable scrap	9,650	4,630							14,300
Gross inputs per 1,000 tons of ammunition	1,080	517					20.8	142	1,760
Recoverable scrap per 1,000 tons of ammunition	409	196							605
Rockets and antitank projectiles									
Weight of component materials		3,660	1,830				1,400	1,150	8,040
Weight of gross inputs		6,950	3,480				1,430	1,170	13,000
Weight of recoverable scrap		2,640	1,320						3,960
Gross inputs per 1,000 tons of ammunition		864	433				178	146	1,620
Recoverable scrap per 1,000 tons of ammunition		328	164						492

Table 10

Estimated Gross Inputs of Materials Required to Produce 1 Unit of Fire or the Equivalent  
for Various Categories of Soviet Ammunition and Quantities of Scrap Recoverable in Production  
(Continued)

Category of Weapon	Cast Iron <u>g/</u>	Carbon Steel <u>g/</u>	Alloy Steel <u>g/</u>	Brass <u>lb/</u>	Copper <u>lb/</u>	Lead <u>g/</u>	Propellants <u>g/</u>	Explosives <u>g/</u>	Short Tons	
									Total <u>g/</u>	Total <u>g/</u>
Bombs and land mines										
Weight of component materials		9,000						7,790	17,300	g/
Weight of gross inputs		17,100						7,950	25,000	g/
Weight of recoverable scrap		6,480							6,480	g/
Gross inputs per 1,000 tons of ammunition		988						460	1,450	g/
Recoverable scrap per 1,000 tons of ammunition		375							375	g/
Aggregate for all categories										
Total weight of component materials <u>f/</u>	13,400	104,000	25,800	48,100	7,310	6,120	34,600	26,700	267,000	g/
Total weight of gross inputs <u>f/</u>	25,500	198,000	49,000	101,000	15,400	6,240	35,300	27,200	458,000	g/
Total weight of recoverable scrap <u>f/</u>	9,650	75,000	18,600	46,700	7,090				157,000	g/
Gross inputs per 1,000 tons of aggregate ammunition mix <u>g/</u>	95.5	742	184	378	57.7	23.4	132	102	1,710	g/
Recoverable scrap per 1,000 tons of aggregate ammunition mix <u>g/</u>	36.1	281	69.7	175	26.6				588	g/

a. Derivation of gross inputs is based on a factor of 1.9; derivation of recoverable scrap, on a factor of 0.72.

b. Derivation of gross inputs is based on a factor of 2.1; derivation of recoverable scrap, on a factor of 0.97.

c. Derivation of gross inputs is based on a factor of 1.02.

d. Because of rounding, figures may not add to totals shown.

e. Total tonnage includes 483 tons allowed for wooden mine cases.

f. Sum of similar items in all categories.

g. Ratio (times 1,000) of sums of gross inputs to total tonnage (267,000 tons).

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B. Inputs of Services.

The services needed to produce ammunition are manpower, electric power, and fuels (coal, oil, and gas). The computations for the inputs of these services are based upon US data for similar services. The only data available, however, relate to the loading, assembling, and packing of ammunition at government installations. <sup>12/</sup> Private industry produces the metal parts for the ammunition but does not maintain records from which the desired data may be readily obtained. Many industrial plants in the USSR produce metal parts for ammunition and ship the parts to military ammunition depots for loading, assembling, and packing.

Table 11,\* which is based on data obtained from 20 US sample pieces of ammunition,\*\* shows the inputs of manpower and of electric power required for loading, assembling, and packing and the inputs of lumber and of steel required for packing 1 U/F of each of the 7 categories of Soviet ammunition, 1 U/F of the aggregate ammunition mix, and 1,000-ton units of the aggregate mix.\*\*\*

Table 12\*\*\*\* shows the inputs of fuel required for loading, assembling, and packing 1 U/F of Soviet ammunition. Because fuels may be used in the form of coal, fuel oil, or gas, the requirements for fuel are presented in terms of British thermal units (Btu)\*\*\*\*\* required per ton of ammunition; if any one of these fuels was used exclusively; and in terms of coal, fuel oil, or gas required per 1,000-ton units of ammunition.

The inputs for loading, assembling, and packing the ammunition listed in Tables 11 and 12 are only a fraction of the manpower, electric power, and fuels needed to produce complete rounds. <sup>13/</sup> Test calculations, based on very fragmentary data, indicated that the manpower required to produce metal parts for US 75-mm and 76-mm complete rounds is roughly between 8 and 12 times the manpower required for loading, assembling, and packing. Similar test calculations for US 75-mm, 76-mm, 90-mm, and 105-mm cartridge cases†

\* Table 11 follows on p. 22.

\*\* These samples were not in all cases included in the 26 US samples used to compute the material inputs.

\*\*\* For the methodology, see Appendix A.

\*\*\*\* Table 12 follows on p. 23.

\*\*\*\*\* A standard measure of heat.

† Continued on p. 24.

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Table 11

Estimated Inputs of Manpower and of Electric Power Required for Loading, Assembling, and Packing  
and Inputs of Lumber and of Steel Required for Packing 1 Unit of Fire of Soviet Ammunition

Category of Weapon	Weight of 1 Unit of Fire (Short Tons)	For Loading, Assembling, and Packing		For Packing	
		Manpower (Thousand Man-Hours)	Electric Power (Thousand Kilowatt-Hours)	Lumber (Thousand Board Feet)	Steel (Short Tons)
Heavy artillery	21,900	93.7	479	2,740	637
Medium artillery	144,000	1,890	5,950	38,300	2,160
Light artillery	21,000	1,400	4,050	6,620	1,890
Small arms	30,800	4,200	32,600	7,020	
Mortars and grenades	23,600	659	7,070	8,010	
Rockets and antitank projectiles	8,040	171	1,120	1,230	
Bombs and land mines	17,300	104	1,100	819 a/	1,020
Total b/	267,000	8,520	52,400	64,700	5,710
Inputs per 1,000 short tons of ammunition (weighted average)		31.9 c/	196	242	21.4

a. 99 percent for land mines.

b. Aggregate ammunition mix. Because of rounding, figures may not add to totals shown.

c. 13.3 man-years.

Table 12

Estimated Inputs of Fuel Required for Loading, Assembling, and Packing 1 Unit of Fire of Soviet Ammunition and the Equivalent Consumption in Terms of Soviet Coal, Fuel Oil, or Natural Gas

Category of Weapon	Weight of 1 Unit of Fire (Short Tons)	Fuel Consumption (Btu <sup>a/</sup> per Short Ton)	Coal Requirement (Short Tons) <sup>b/</sup>	Fuel Oil Requirement (Short Tons) <sup>c/</sup>	Gas Requirement (Short Tons) <sup>d/</sup>
Heavy artillery	21,900	375,000	393	228	206
Medium artillery	144,000	1,090,000	7,510	4,360	3,930
Light artillery	21,000	6,090,000	6,120	3,550	3,210
Small arms	30,800	2,130,000	3,140	1,820	1,640
Mortars and grenades	23,600	5,040,000	5,690	3,300	2,980
Rockets and antitank projectiles	8,040	3,930,000	1,510	878	792
Bombs and land mines	17,300	1,160,000	960	558	503
Total <sup>e/</sup>	267,000	19,800,000	25,300	14,700	13,300
Inputs per 1,000 short tons of ammunition (weighted average)			94.8	55.1	49.8

a. British thermal units.

b. Assuming exclusive use of coal.

c. Assuming exclusive use of fuel oil.

d. Assuming exclusive use of natural gas.

e. Because of rounding, figures may not add to totals shown.

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indicated that the requirements for electric power to produce cartridge cases alone are several times the power required for loading, assembling, and packing the complete rounds. Moreover, the requirements for fuel to produce the cartridge cases are 8 to 14 times the requirements for loading, assembling, and packing the complete rounds.

C. Materials for Packing.

Materials used for packing, although inputs for production of ammunition, must be considered somewhat differently because the boxes and containers can be used more than once. In wartime the amount of re-use varies considerably. In peacetime the amount of re-use depends upon the relative quantities of ammunition used for training purposes or stockpiled, because stockpiling immobilizes the boxes and containers. No allowances were made in this research aid for the repeated use of boxes and containers, and the packing inputs therefore represent maximum consumption.\*

Boxes for ammunition to be used by the ground forces are made of wood; containers for naval ammunition are made of steel and sometimes of aluminum. Because steel is used more frequently than aluminum, only steel is considered in this research aid. Heavy artillery projectiles, rockets, and bombs use little or no packing. The estimated quantities of lumber and steel required for packing Soviet ammunition are shown in Table 11.\*\*

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\* For the methodology, see Appendix A.

\*\* P. 22, above.

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APPENDIX A

METHODOLOGY

1. Analysis of Soviet Ammunition.

Table 13\* shows the method of calculation used to estimate the weight of 1 U/F for the Soviet security troops. The weight of 1 U/F was estimated by multiplying (a) the number of units used in each category of weapon by the number of rounds in 1 U/F and (b) the product of these calculations\*\* by the weight of a representative round of ammunition. The estimated weight of 1 U/F for the Soviet Army\*\*\* and for the naval infantry\*\*\*\* were derived by the same method used for the Soviet security troops.

The number of antitank mines was estimated by allowing 1,500 mines to each of the 105 rifle divisions and 45 mechanized divisions and by allowing 1,000 mines to each of the 20 tank divisions, 20 artillery divisions, and 5 cavalry divisions. 14/ Hand grenades were allotted on the basis of four to each man, in accordance with the strength of the various divisions. 15/

The weight of a representative round as shown in column 5 of Table 13 means the weight of the round most commonly used for a particular weapon -- high-explosive, fragmentation-high-explosive, or armor-piercing. Illuminating, smoke, chemical, and leaflet-type rounds have not been considered, because they are of comparatively minor importance. 16/

The number of rounds for the guns of the Soviet naval fleet\*\*\*\*\* was computed by multiplying the estimated number of rounds carried by the various classes of vessels by the number of vessels in each class. 17/ Because information on the weights of Soviet naval ammunition was inadequate, it was necessary to make up a set of synthetic

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\* Table 13 follows on p. 26.

\*\* The total number of rounds in 1 U/F for 1 category of weapon.

\*\*\* See Table 2, p. 5, above.

\*\*\*\* See Table 6, p. 10, above.

\*\*\*\*\* See Table 4, p. 8, above.

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Table 13  
Estimated Number of Rounds and Weight of 1 Unit of Fire for 400,000 Soviet Security Troops

1	2	3	4	5	6
Weapon	Unit	Number of Rounds in 1 U/F a/ for 1 Weapon	Total Number of Rounds for 1 Category of Weapon (Thousands)	Weight of a Representative Round (Pounds)	Weight of 1 U/F b/ (Short Tons)
T-34 tank with 85-mm c/ gun	876	84	73.6	33.22	1,220
Armored car d/	511				
Scout car	619				
76-mm self-propelled gun	330	90	30	18.08	271
85-mm antitank gun	648	140	90.7	35	1,590
57-mm antitank gun	1,820	200	364	14.33	2,610
120-mm mortar	324	80	25.9	35.28	457
82-mm mortar	3,100	120	372	6.94	1,290
SPG-82 antitank projectiles	660	42	27.7	7	97
RPD-2 antitank machinegun	9,630	9	86.7	3.52	153
12.7-mm antiaircraft machinegun	1,310	6,000	7,860	2,160 e/	1,210
7.62-mm heavy machinegun	6,170 f/	2,500 f/	55,300 g/	365 e/	1,440
7.62-mm light machinegun	14,000	800			
7.62-mm rifle and carbine	197,000	100			
7.62-mm submachinegun	48,800 f/	300 f/	22,900 h/	170	278
7.62-mm pistol and revolver	41,200	18			
Antitank grenades	86,700	divisional basis	86.7	2.4	104
Hand grenades	1,260,000 f/	4 per man	1,310 i/	1.53 j/	1,000
Land mines	86,700	divisional basis	86.7	13	564
Total					12,300 k/

- a. Unit of fire.  
b. Column 4 times column 5.  
c. Millimeter.  
d. Included under machineguns.  
e. Grains. Seven thousand grains equal 1 pound avoirdupois.  
f. Does not include armament for armored vehicles.  
g. Includes 9,030,000 rounds for machineguns mounted in armored vehicles.  
h. Includes 7,570,000 rounds for submachineguns carried in armored vehicles.  
i. Includes 48,200 grenades carried in armored vehicles.  
j. Average.  
k. Rounded.

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weights, using US naval ammunition as a base. 18/ These synthetic weights were then multiplied by the number of rounds for each type of gun, and the result was divided by 6 to obtain the equivalent of 1 U/F for the army.

On the basis of US naval experience, it was estimated that 50 percent of the Soviet shells of 6 inches or more in caliber would be high-capacity shells and 50 percent would be armor-piercing shells. 19/ All shells less than 6 inches in caliber were estimated to be high-capacity shells. 20/ Because the Soviet coast defense artillery\* is composed of naval type guns and is operated by the navy, the ammunition allowance per barrel was based upon naval standards.

For weapons other than bombs, the estimated weight of 1 equivalent U/F for the Soviet Air Force\*\* was obtained by the same method used for the Soviet security troops. The total number of rounds for the guns was estimated from plane armaments and ammunition loads. 21/ The total bomb load was calculated on the basis of the estimated bomb capacities of the planes. 22/

## 2. Computation of Component Materials in 1 Unit of Fire.

Table 14\*\*\* shows the estimated percentages of component materials in 1 U/F or the equivalent for various categories of Soviet ammunition. The percentages of Table 14 form the basis for the computations of Table 9.\*\*\*\*

## 3. Derivation of Gross Input Factors for Component Materials.†

Because there are no Soviet data upon which to compute input factors for Soviet production of ammunition, it was necessary to use data on US production. Twenty-six samples of US ammunition were selected -- mainly on the basis of the availability of information -- and their gross input factors were computed. 23/ The materials used in production of ammunition were grouped into ferrous materials (cast iron, carbon steel, and alloy steel); nonferrous materials (brass and††

\* See Table 5, p. 10, above.

\*\* See Table 7, p. 12, above.

\*\*\* Table 14 follows on p. 28.

\*\*\*\* P. 14, above.

† Similar procedures were used to derive factors for recoverable scrap.

†† Continued on p. 31.

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Table 14  
Estimated Percentages of Component Materials in 1 Unit of Fire or the Equivalent  
for Various Categories of Soviet Ammunition

Weapon	Cast Iron	Carbon Steel a/*	Alloy Steel a/	Brass b/	Copper c/	Lead	Propellants	Explosives
Heavy artillery								
14-inch naval gun			70		3		23.5	3.5
12.6-inch naval gun			72.2		3		21.2	3.6
12-inch naval gun			72.8		3		20.7	3.5
10-inch naval gun			73.5		3		20	3.5
203-mm d/ howitzer		70.4			3		13	13.6
7.1-inch naval gun			67.9		3		24	5.1
152-mm gun-howitzer and self-propelled gun		59.7		14.7	3		12.9	9.7
152-mm howitzer		70		5.1	3		7.4	14.5
6-inch naval gun			54.4	17.6	3		20	5
5.9-inch naval gun			52.8	17.6	3		21.6	5
Medium artillery								
5.1-inch naval gun		55.1		18.5	3		17.9	5.5
5-inch naval gun		55		18.4	3		18.1	5.5
122-mm gun.		25.3	25.3	18.3	3		16.2	11.9
122-mm howitzer		67.7		6.8	3		8.1	14.4
4.7-inch naval gun		54.5		19.1	3		17.8	5.6
4-inch naval gun		55.7		19.5	3		16.5	5.3
100-mm gun		55.3		20.3	3		16	5.4
3.9-inch naval dual-purpose gun		42.9		28.7	3		18.2	7.2
3.5-inch naval gun		47.8		26.9	3		17.4	4.9
76-2- and 85-mm gun		53.4		21.7	3		16.9	5
3-inch naval dual-purpose gun		27.7	27.7	19.2	3		17.2	5.2
		54.4		23.4	3		15.4	3.8

\* Footnotes for Table 14 follow on p. 30.

Table 14  
Estimated Percentages of Component Materials in 1 Unit of Fire or the Equivalent  
for Various Categories of Soviet Ammunition  
(Continued)

Weapon	Cast Iron	Carbon Steel <u>a/</u>	Alloy Steel <u>a/</u>	Brass <u>b/</u>	Copper <u>c/</u>	Lead	Propellants	Explosives
<b>Light artillery</b>								
57-mm antitank gun and antiaircraft gun		24.6	24.6	32.8	3		13.3	1.7
57-mm naval antiaircraft gun		53.3		37.2	3		3.3	3.2
45-mm naval gun		67		23	3		3.5	3.5
37-mm antiaircraft gun		45.1		34.1	3		14.9	2.9
37-mm aircraft gun		44.5		35.2	3		14.8	2.4
23-mm aircraft gun		52		33.2	3		8.8	3
20-mm aircraft gun		43.4		37	3		12.2	4.4
<b>Small arms</b>								
12.7- and 14.5-mm machinegun		21.9		48.2	13.6	3.2	13.1	
7.62- and 9-mm small arms		35.3 <u>e/</u>		19.8		31.1	13.8	
<b>Mortars and grenades</b>								
160- and 240-mm mortar <u>f/</u>		80.2					3.1	16.7
120-mm mortar		40.1					3.1	16.7
82-mm mortar	40.1						2.7	13.1
Antitank grenades	84.2							46
Hand grenades	92							8
<b>Rockets and Antitank projectiles</b>								
300-mm artillery rockets		38	19 <u>b/</u>				11.3	31.7
132-mm artillery and aircraft rockets		48.4	24.2				16.7	10.7
107-mm recoilless projectiles <u>h/</u>		44.2	22.1				19.1	14.6
SPG-82 antitank projectiles <u>h/</u>		44.2	22.1				19.1	14.6
PRG-antitank projectiles <u>h/</u>		44.2	22.1				19.1	14.6

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Table 14  
Estimated Percentages of Component Materials in 1 Unit of Fire or the Equivalent  
for Various Categories of Soviet Ammunition  
(Continued)

Weapon	Cast Iron	Carbon Steel a/	Alloy Steel a/	Brass b/	Copper c/	Lead	Propellants	Explosives
Bombs and land mines								
General-purpose and demolition bombs		45			Negligible			55
Fragmentation bombs		90			Negligible			10
Armor-piercing bombs		29			Negligible			71
Incendiary bombs		60			Negligible			40 d/
Antitank and antitransport mines		21 d/			Negligible			58

- a. All US naval shells of about 6 inches and above are mostly alloy steel in US practice. Army and navy projectiles of most other type rounds are carbon steel with the exception of armor-piercing shells which are alloy steel.
- b. Brass (70 percent copper and 30 percent zinc) is used in nearly all shell casings and primers.
- c. Copper is used in nearly all rotating bands, constituting about 3 percent of the component weight of a round.
- d. Millimeter.
- e. Includes steel used in the estimated 50 percent of the cartridge cases made of steel. The other 50 percent of the cartridge cases are made of brass. Steel for cartridge cases represents 19.8 percent of the total weight of the ammunition used by this category of weapon.
- f. The percentages are the same as those calculated for a 120-mm mortar.
- g. About one-third of the steel is alloy used in the motor.
- h. Percentages obtained from the US 2.36-inch antitank rocket.
- i. Mostly incendiary material.
- j. Reduced by one-half to allow for wooden cases.

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copper mill products); and a miscellaneous category including lead, propellants, and explosives. Changes were made in the US factors to allow for known differences between the Soviet and the US ammunition being compared. The factors thus obtained were applied to the estimated weights of the various component materials to derive the gross input factors for Soviet ammunition.

#### 4. Derivation of Service Inputs.

The input data for manpower, electric power, and fuels were available for only 20 US sample items of ammunition, which were not in all cases the same US items used to compute the inputs of materials. A new alignment of the items of Soviet ammunition with the US samples was necessary before the US data could be properly weighted.

Table 15\* lists the 20 US sample items of ammunition employed and the computed quantities of the nearest equivalent Soviet ammunition in 1 U/F. Because the data are not homogeneous as were the data for the inputs of materials, it was necessary to derive a weighted input factor for each category rather than a single factor for the entire aggregate. The weighted input factors were derived by multiplying US input requirements per ton of each U/F by the quantity of the nearest equivalent Soviet ammunition in 1 U/F.

The manpower and electric power required to load, assemble, and pack the respective U/F mix were then recapitulated in Table 11.\*\* The figures for fuel, however, needed further treatment to reduce them to a common denominator -- British thermal units -- and to re-expand them in terms of Soviet coal, fuel oil, and gas.

The inputs of fuel were reduced to British thermal units by multiplying the weighted averages listed in Table 15 by the average heat value of the US oil or gas. The average heat value of the oil was taken at 138,000 Btu per gallon and the gas at 1,000 Btu per cubic foot. <sup>24/</sup> These calculations resulted in the following heat requirements to load, assemble, and pack 1 ton of each category of weapon\*\*\*:

\* Table 15 follows on p. 32.

\*\* P. 22, above.

\*\*\* Continued on p. 35.

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Table 15  
Estimated Soviet Inputs for Services in Production of Ammunition a/\*

1	2	Manpower		Electric Power		Fuel Oil		Gas	
		3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
US Weapon	Short Tons of Nearest Equivalent Soviet Ammunition in 1 Unit of Fire	US Man-Hours per Short Ton	Total Soviet Man-Hours b/	US Kilowatt-Hours per Short Ton	Total Soviet Kilowatt-Hours c/	US Gallons per Short Ton	Total Soviet Gallons d/	US Cubic Feet per Short Ton	Total Soviet Cubic Feet e/
<b>Heavy artillery</b>									
240-mm 2/ howitzer	2,560	6.91	17,700	33.4	85,500	5.97	15,300		
8-inch howitzer	2,550	6.88	17,500	21.7	55,300	3.88	9,890		
155-mm gun	16,800	3.48	58,500	20.1	338,000	2.05	34,400		
Total	21,900		23,700		479,000		59,600		
Weighted average		4.28 g/		21.9 h/		2.72 i/			
<b>Medium artillery</b>									
105-mm howitzer	24,400	5.6	137,000	42.9	1,050,000	8.2	200,000		
90-mm gun	118,000	14.7	1,730,000	40.6	4,790,000	7.76	916,000		
76-mm gun	1,490	14.6	21,800	75.4	112,000	15.4	22,900		
Total	144,000		1,890,000		5,950,000		1,140,000		
Weighted average		13.1 g/		41.3 h/		7.9 i/			
<b>Light artillery</b>									
57-mm recoilless rifle	15,000	36.7	550,000	253	3,800,000	51.7	776,000		
20-mm gun	6,010	142	853,000	42.2	254,000	25	150,000		
Total	21,000		1,400,000		4,050,000		926,000		
Weighted average		66.7 g/		193 h/		44.1 i/			

\* Footnotes for Table 15 follow on p. 34.

Table 15  
Estimated Soviet Inputs for Services in Production of Ammunition a/  
(Continued)

1	2	Manpower		Electric Power		Fuel Oil		Gas	
		3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
US Weapon	Short Tons of Nearest Equivalent Soviet Ammunition in 1 Unit of Fire	US Man-Hours per Short Ton	Total Soviet Man- Hours b/	US Kilowatt-Hours per Short Ton	Total Soviet Kilowatt- Hours c/	US Gallons per Short Ton	Total Soviet Gallons d/	US Cubic Feet per Short Ton	Total Soviet Cubic Feet e/
Small arms									
50 caliber	12,400	77.3	959,000	406	5,030,000			963	11,900,000
30 caliber	18,400	176	3,240,000	1,500	27,600,000			2,920	53,700,000
Total	30,800		4,200,000		32,600,000				65,600,000
Weighted average		136 g/		1,060 h/				2,130	
Mortars and grenades									
4.2-inch mortar	11,200	14.1	158,000	76.2	853,000	12.4	139,000		
81-mm mortar	4,950	18.7	92,600	219	1,080,000	44.7	221,000		
Rifle grenade	434	N.A.		428	186,000	42	18,200		
Hand grenade	7,000	54.9	408,000 d/	707	4,950,000	69.2	484,000		
Total	23,600		659,000		7,070,000		862,000		
Weighted average		27.9 g/		300 h/		36.5 l/			
Rockets and antitank projectiles									
4.5-inch rocket	6,810	16.5	112,000	120	817,000	24.5	167,000		
3.5-inch rocket	1,230	47.8	58,800	246	303,000	50.1	61,600		
Total	8,040		171,000		1,120,000		229,000		
Weighted average		21.3 g/		139 h/		28.5 l/			

Table 15  
Estimated Soviet Inputs for Services in Production of Ammunition a/  
(Continued)

1	2	Manpower		Electric Power		Fuel Oil		Gas	
		3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
US Weapon	Short Tons of Nearest Equivalent Soviet Ammunition in 1 Unit of Fire	US Man-Hours per Short Ton	Total Soviet Man- Hours <u>b/</u>	US Kilowatt-Hours per Short Ton	Total Soviet Kilowatt- Hours <u>c/</u>	US Gallons per Short Ton	Total Soviet Gallons <u>d/</u>	US Cubic Feet per Short Ton	Total Soviet Cubic Feet <u>e/</u>
Bombs and land mines									
100-lb <u>k/</u> general- purpose bomb	7,490	7.72	57,800	72	539,000	12.9	96,600		
750-lb demolition bomb	7,490	2.46	18,400	33.1	248,000	5.9	44,200		
Antitank mine	2,300	11.9	27,400	138	317,000	2.24	5,150		
Total	<u>17,300</u>		<u>104,000</u>		<u>1,100,000</u>		<u>146,000</u>		
Weighted average		6.01 <u>g/</u>		63.6 <u>h/</u>		8.44 <u>i/</u>			

a. Soviet ammunition tonnages are weighted by US service input figures per short ton. Input figures are for loading, assembling, and packing only. Figures may not add to totals shown because of rounding.

b. Column 2 times column 3.

c. Column 2 times column 5.

d. Column 2 times column 7.

e. Column 2 times column 9.

f. Millimeter.

g. Total of column 4 divided by total of column 2.

h. Total of column 6 divided by total of column 2.

i. Total of column 8 divided by total of column 2.

j. Rifle grenade tonnage and hand grenade tonnage combined.

k. Pound.

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<u>Category</u>	<u>British Thermal Units (Thousands)</u>
Heavy artillery	375
Medium artillery	1,090
Light artillery	6,090
Small arms	2,130
Mortars and grenades	5,040
Rockets and antitank projectiles	3,930
Bombs and land mines	1,160

To re-expand these heat values in terms of Soviet fuels, it was necessary to know the average heat values of Soviet fuels. The following values were estimated: coal, 10,450 Btu per pound, or 20.9 million Btu per ton; fuel oil, 18,000 Btu per pound or 36 million Btu per ton; and gas, at 39.9 million Btu per ton.

With these figures it was possible to compute in tons the Soviet coal, fuel oil, and gas required to load, assemble, and pack 1 U/F in each category of ammunition. For example, the computation for heavy artillery is as follows:

Heavy artillery tonnage times heat required per ton equals total heat required: 21,900 times 375,000 equals 8,210 million Btu.

$$\text{Coal: } \frac{8,210 \text{ million Btu}}{20.9 \text{ million Btu ton}} = 393 \text{ tons coal.}$$

$$\text{Fuel oil: } \frac{8,210 \text{ million Btu}}{36 \text{ million Btu ton}} = 228 \text{ tons fuel oil.}$$

$$\text{Gas: } \frac{8,210 \text{ million Btu}}{39.9 \text{ million Btu ton}} = 206 \text{ tons gas.}$$

The other categories were similarly computed and the results were recapitulated in Table 12.\*

\* P. 23, above.

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5. Wood and Steel for Packaging.

Data on the size and/or the gross and net weights of Soviet Army ammunition boxes were available. <sup>25/</sup> From these data it was possible to compute the number of board-feet per ton required by each type of Soviet round which was packaged in wood. In each case the number of board-feet per ton was then multiplied by the tonnage of the pertinent round to obtain the total number of board-feet required for that round. These subtotal figures were added for each category to obtain the total amount of wood in board-feet (properly weighted by the tonnage of each round). These weighted totals for each category are shown in Table 11.\* In computing the requirement for wood per round, 15 percent was allowed for sawdust and waste. This scrap can be salvaged and used for manufacturing pressboard and other similar products, but no attempt to compute the amount of scrap recovered was made.

Because no data were available on Soviet naval containers, which use most of the steel consumed in packaging ammunition, synthetic weights for powder cans and shell containers were computed from a curve based upon US naval cans and containers. The number of pounds of steel per ton of the pertinent rounds was computed, multiplied by the tonnage of that round, and totaled by category to obtain the weighted requirements for packing steel per category. These category totals are shown in Table 11. In computing the requirement for steel per round, a gross input factor of 1.9 for ferrous metals was used.\*\*

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\* P. 22, above.

\*\* See III, A, 2, p. 13, above.

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APPENDIX B

GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE

The ideal data upon which to build a report on input factors would come from the files of the producing plants. Because such data obviously are not available for Soviet ammunition plants, an alternative is to use analogical methods. It is in the area of analogical data that a practical gap exists. In the US, data are available on the manpower, electric power, and fuels required for loading, assembling, and packing ammunition because that work is done mostly in governmental installations. The metal parts, however, are made principally by private contractors who also produce other items. These contractors do not keep their records in a form in which the above data are easily available -- such data usually being lumped under "factory expense" which also includes insurance, maintenance, and the like. Moreover, there is a reluctance on the part of the contractors to divulge the necessary information.

There is also a need for information which will enable analysts to discount and to modify US data to suit Soviet industrial conditions. Comparisons then might be made for the two countries in regard to the productivity of labor, to the use of manpower versus electric power, and to waste and spoilage.

Other gaps concern data on Soviet naval ammunition and logistical information on supplies of ammunition and stockpiling practices of the Soviet Navy and Air Force.

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APPENDIX C

SOURCE REFERENCES

Almost all the data used to compute the ammunition mixes are from formal publications or contributions of the US armed services. Most of the data from which the input factors were computed and the data on service inputs and prices came from the War Mobilization Planning Division of the Ordnance Ammunition Command, US Army, Joliet, Illinois, and may be assumed to be reliable. Some of the data on inputs came from a 1947 publication of the Civilian Production Authority and are believed to be fairly reliable, although possibly a little high.

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Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated "Eval.," have the following significance:

<u>Source of Information</u>	<u>Information</u>
Doc. - Documentary	1 - Confirmed by other sources
A - Completely reliable	2 - Probably true
B - Usually reliable	3 - Possibly true
C - Fairly reliable	4 - Doubtful
D - Not usually reliable	5 - Probably false
E - Not reliable	6 - Cannot be judged
F - Cannot be judged	

"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff officer, all of which may carry the field evaluation "Documentary."


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Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report. No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation on the cited document.

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